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The IRS ended a long-time practice of requiring most nonprofits to disclose substantial donor 
names and addresses on the nonprofit annual tax return. It is largely seen as a battle over campaign 
finance rather than tax enforcement. Two of the nonprofits involved, social welfare organizations and 
business leagues, are referred to as “dark money” organizations because they allow individuals to 
influence elections while maintaining donor anonymity. Many in the campaign finance community are 
concerned that this change means wealthy donors can avoid campaign finance laws and have no reason 
to fear being discovered. In this Article, I focus on whether the information is needed for the enforcement 
of the tax law and/or to support ancillary legal goals. I contend the IRS ought to collect this substantial 
donor information as it did for over 79 years. Though the collection of donor information may not be 
essential for groups such as social clubs, fraternities and sororities, and mutual ditch companies, the 
collection of this information non-publicly by the IRS is important in both enforcing tax-exempt 
requirements and in enforcing the tax law generally. Tax law prohibits the distribution of earnings from a 
nonprofit to those who control the organization. Substantial donors are classic suspects for seeking such 
improper receipts through their control. Thus, the information is key to IRS auditors. Considering the 
deficient budget of the IRS to ensure a properly enforced Code, the failure to collect that information puts 
the IRS in a disadvantaged position. While as a democratic matter, there may be some modest benefit 
from alleviating donors from the worry that the government will know about their political contributions, 
the harm to those who are not able to make use of these structures, the harm to those who are deprived of 
information regarding the biases associated with particular political activity, and the harm to the belief 
that the tax, campaign finance, and nonprofit law will be enforced equally upon all, is more significant. 
With these considerations in mind, the IRS and Treasury ought to rescind its most recent guidance on this 
matter. If not, Congress ought to require this information be disclosed by law. 
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On July 16, 2020, an FBI Agent in the Southern District of Ohio filed a criminal 
complaint against Larry Householder, the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the state of 
Ohio, along with several other defendants, including a social welfare organization claiming to be 
exempt under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) for a $60 million bribery 
scheme related to state energy policy.1 One of the defendants is specifically quoted as saying that 
their bribery scheme was not likely to be discovered because of the use of a social welfare 
organization.  
 
Clark discussed with Householder, the use of a 501(c)(4), controlled by 
Householder, to receive payments: “what’s interesting is that there’s a newer 
solution that didn’t occur in, 13 years ago, is that they can give as much or more 
to the (c)(4) and nobody would ever know. So you don’t have to be afraid of 
anyone because there’s a mechanism to change it.2 
 
Clark was likely referring to the fact that in 2020, the IRS ended a long-time practice3 of 
requiring most nonprofit tax-exempt organizations to disclose substantial donor names and 
addresses on Schedule B to the Form 990, the annual tax information return of nonprofits.4 This 
                                                          
1 Criminal Complaint, U.S. v. Matthew Borges, Case No. 1:20-MJ-00526 (July 16, 2020). 
2 Id. at 15, par. 45. 
3 The IRS issued the first Form 990 for the 1941 tax year in 1942. Cheryl Chasin, Debra Kawecki & David Jones, 
Form 990 in IRS EO CPE text 2002. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicg02.pdf; T.D. 5125, 1942-1 C.B. 101. 
See also 20 TAXES 303 (1942) (describing the new Form 990 requiring substantial donors to be disclosed).  Paul 
Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, I.R.S. SOI BULLETIN (2007-2008) 
(Congress first required a return for exempt organizations in 1942). In a blog post on The Surly Subgroup, I posted 
an I.R.S. Form 990 from the 1940s. Philip Hackney, Dark Days: Blindfolding Nonprofit Regulators, May 2, 2016. 
See post here: https://surlysubgroup.com/2016/05/02/dark-days-blindfolding-nonprofit-regulators/ 
4 US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Department, and IRS Announce Significant Reform to Protect Personal 
Donor Information to Certain Tax-Exempt Organizations, July 16, 2018. See announcement here: 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm426 This is the announcement for Rev. Proc. 2018-38. See 
Schedule B to the Form 990 here: https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf. A US District Court struck down the 
IRS’s first effort to change this rule because the IRS failed to follow the Administrative Procedure Act; Bullock v. 
IRS, 401 F.Supp.3d 1144 (2019). The IRS and Treasury Department proposed the same rule in regulations pursuant 
to notice and comment in late 2019.  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [REG–102508–16] RIN 1545–BN28, 




is a hotly contested partisan issue. Republicans tend to support the end of the collection of this 
donor information, while Democrats tend to support its maintenance. It is largely seen as a battle 
over campaign finance rather than tax enforcement.5 In this Article, I try to avoid the partisan 
battle and ask broadly whether the change is wise. I focus on whether the information is needed 
for the enforcement of the tax law and/or to support ancillary legal goals. Ancillary legal goals 
might include the transparent operation of nonprofits in a national sense, and as back up support 
for legal regimes such as federal and state campaign finance and state law enforcement 
associated with nonprofit organizations.6 
I argue that the IRS ought to collect this substantial donor information as it did for over 
78 years.7 Though the collection of donor information may not be essential for groups such as 
social clubs,8 fraternities and sororities,9 and mutual ditch companies,10 the collection of this 
information from so-called “dark money” organizations, such as social welfare organizations11 
and business leagues12 likely has a real impact on the enforcement of the tax law as to tax-
exempt organizations and as to the individuals who contribute to them.13 Additionally, though 
Larry Householder and his co-defendants may have been caught secretly bribing officials 
through a social welfare organization there are likely many more individuals using these vehicles 
fraudulently who will never be caught. The collection of that information is an easy way to 
stymie such illegal activity. I argue the IRS can and ought to consider the potential harm to 
ancillary laws such as campaign finance and fraud in evaluating whether to require the collection 
of this information. Fundamentally though, the tax law enforcement role alone makes this 
information worth continuing to collect. Considering the deficient budget of the IRS to ensure a 
properly enforced Code,14 the failure to collect that information puts the IRS in a disadvantaged 
position it need not put itself in with respect to auditing wealthy taxpayers.15  
Most nonprofits meet their primary tax compliance requirement with the IRS by filing an 
annual information return called the Form 990.16 In addition to letting the IRS know the 
organization is complying with the tax law, it discloses to the public the organization’s activities. 
                                                          
Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations, Published in the 
Federal Register September 10, 2019. 
5 See Roger Colinvaux, Social Welfare and Political Organizations: Ending the Plague of Inconsistency, 21 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481 (2018) [hereinafter Plague of Inconsistency]. See also J. Breyer asking the U.S. Solicitor 
General in oral argument for Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000 (2018), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 
973 (2021) whether the challenge in that case to the California Law requiring charitable organizations to file a 
Schedule B with the state attorney general “is really a stalking horse for [bringing down] campaign finance 
disclosure laws.” https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-251_h3ci.pdf  
6 Though Treasury has issued a final regulation, this project is still worthwhile because Treasury could write another 
rule and Congress could mandate the disclosure of this information. 
7 See infra Part III(A). 
8 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7). 
9 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(8). 
10 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(12). 
11 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4). 
12 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6). 
13 Though I left out labor unions, that is purposeful as there is already a robust donor disclosure regime associated 
with these organizations. 
14 See infra Part III(C). 
15 The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering whether a similar California law that requires charitable 
organizations to submit this major donor information to the state’s attorney general is Constitutional under the First 
Amendment in Americans For Prosperity, supra note 5. 
16 26 U.S.C. § 6033. 




Thus, the Form 990 broadly serves both a tax enforcement role and a democratic role (in a 
“sunshine is said to be the best disinfectant” model)17 and it has long served those dual 
purposes.18  
The requirement to disclose substantial donor names and addresses is a small part of the 
information gathered on the Form 990, an information return that broadly informs the IRS and 
the public about what the nonprofit did during the taxable year. Though most of the Form is 
publicly disclosed, this donor information was and is generally not.19 The most common 
argument for not requiring a nonprofit to disclose donor information to the IRS is that it is not 
relevant to the IRS tax collection function, and thus should be eliminated. This argument is made 
up of two parts. The first is that that the IRS has only one function, collecting tax. The second is 
that this information does not help the IRS in its primary role of tax collection.  The IRS itself 
made a pragmatic rather than legal argument. It said the information is administratively 
burdensome to the IRS and to those who must file the form, and it just does not use the 
information that much.20 While those contentions may be true, they ignore the larger regulatory 
impact of ending the requirement. 
Wealthy contributors have never liked the fact that their names were turned over to the 
IRS.21 Congress even moved to eliminate the entire Schedule B back in 2016.22 Arguably, this 
battle is over wealthy interests fighting to keep their ability to keep their political activity 
anonymous, even to (maybe especially to) the IRS. Though the IRS has eliminated the 
requirement for tax-exempt organizations, this Article still has relevance because of the 
possibility that Congress might move to eliminate this requirement as to charities as well. 
Additionally, the IRS could regulatorily renew the requirement, or alternatively Congress could 
mandate the IRS to require this disclosure.  
Fortunately, and rightly, the IRS did not eliminate the requirement for charitable 
organizations, which Congress had proposed back in 2016. Donor information is key to 
charitable organization oversight from a tax exemption perspective. It allows the IRS to see to 
whom an organization might be distributing earnings violating the absolute prohibition on 
inurement placed on charitable organizations.23 The recent college admissions scandal perhaps 
highlights the usefulness of requiring an organization to provide that information to the IRS.24 Of 
course, as the IRS acknowledges, this information as to charitable organizations is legislatively 
required.25  
                                                          
17 See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) (“Publicity is justly 
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric 
light the most efficient policeman. And publicity has already played an important part in the struggle against the 
Money Trust.”). Also consider Immanuel Kant’s formula of public right, “[a]ll actions affecting the rights of other 
human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public”. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual 
Peace A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 126 (translated Nisbet 1971). 
18 See Infra Part III. 
19 Charitable organizations and political organizations must still furnish this information on the Form 990. It is 
publicized for charitable organizations that are private foundations and political organizations. 
20 US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Department and IRS Announce Significant Reform to Protect Personal 




22 H.R. 5053. 
23 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). 
24 Kelly Phillips Erb, Tax Fraud a Key Role in College Admissions Scandal, FORBES (March 12, 2019). 
25 26 U.S.C. § 6033. 




The most intensely fought political battle associated over disclosure of donor names and 
addresses is fought regarding section 501(c)(4) and (6) organizations. Many refer to section 
501(c)(4) social welfare organizations as “dark money organizations” because they need not 
publicly disclose their donors, yet many of these organizations actively attempt to influence our 
political campaigns and legislators. This strongly suggests that the reason this issue of disclosure 
resonates at such a high frequency in our political system is that it is perceived as a battle over 
justice in a democratic sense.   
In the political battle, Democrats argue that this system provides an end run around 
campaign finance disclosure law by allowing individuals and corporations to engage in politics 
anonymously by contributing to social welfare organizations and business leagues. This corrupts 
our democracy because the regime allows individuals and corporations to influence politics 
anonymously. Key to this notion is that access to information is a liberal right that must 
accompany a well working democracy or polyarchy.26 Of course, the former system was only 
quasi-disclosure because donor names and addresses are not under the current system disclosed 
to the public but only disclosed to the IRS. The IRS would then share that information with many 
state governments so there was a check on particularly underhanded political activity.27 
Opponents of disclosure worry about the harmful influence disclosing has on the equally 
important liberal right of freedom of association and freedom of speech by dissuading people 
from contributing to the causes they hold dear. Disclosure may harm full and free participation in 
our democratic sphere. Additionally, there is a potential harm to the IRS as a governing agency 
in overseeing political-related activity.28 Each of these are real concerns and this article will 
consider each to provide a recommendation regarding what path the IRS should take. 
All of this sits within a context of a lack of IRS enforcement of the tax law that we should 
not overlook. A Pro-Publica investigation in 2019 showed that the IRS audits the working-poor 
at the same rate it audits the wealthiest one percent.29 In that investigation, the reporter noted that 
in response to a query from a senator the IRS replied that it wanted to audit the wealthy at a 
greater rate, but it could not and would not until it received more resources from Congress. In 
2020, the IRS began talking of interest in auditing wealthy interests.30 This effort was described 
as similar to an earlier IRS effort called the “Wealth Squad.” In addition to increasing the audits 
of the wealthy, the IRS announced plans in 2020 to audit over 1,000 private foundations 
                                                          
26 Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. L. Q. 1 (1976). See Lloyd Hitoshi 
Mayer, Politics and the Public’s Right to Know, 13 ELECT. L. J. 138 (2014) (examining the right to know in the 
context of political campaigns and lobbying). 
27 For instance, it is illegal for a foreign individual to seek to influence a political campaign in the US. Although the 
IRS does not enforce this rule, an organization that sought out such foreign donations would at least have to disclose 
under penalties of perjury a violation of the law to the IRS. 
28 Philip Hackney, Political Justice and Tax Policy: The Social Welfare Organization Case, 18 TEX. A&M L. REV. 
271 (2021). 





30 Guinevere Moore, High Income Households And Private Foundations: Time To Gear Up For An IRS Exam, 
FORBES, June 22, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/irswatch/2020/06/22/high-income-households-and-private-
foundations-time-to-gear-up-for-an-irs-exam/#26c938c518b4  




connected to wealthy interests.31 The choice to eliminate basic information about wealthy 
transfers of money to corporate entities seems to run counter to the idea that the IRS cares or 
intends to exercise oversight of wealthy individuals. 
The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering the Constitutionality of a California 
requirement that charities operating in or soliciting money in the state of California must file the 
Schedule B to the Form 990 with the California Attorney General’s office.32 In the case, 
Americans for Prosperity argues that the California donor information requirement harms First 
Amendment association rights by subjecting donors to controversial causes to harassment.33 
They further argue that the state’s interest in preventing charitable fraud could be met through 
the narrower means of only seeking this information in an investigation rather than making this 
banket demand. Were the Court to uphold a facial challenge to the California law, it is possible 
that the IRS’s ability to similarly demand that information could be considered to violate First 
Amendment Standards as well. The question of the Constitutionality of this provision is beyond 
the scope of this Article. The focus of the Article is on the government interest involved in 
providing this information. I hope to show why the collection of the information is a critical 
piece of regulating nonprofits. 
Part II examines the legal regimes of social welfare organizations, business leagues, and 
related tax-exempt organization requirements. Part III discusses the role of information returns, 
information reporting, the current tax enforcement environment, and the relationship of political 
justice and democracy to these matters. Part IV discusses the ancillary legal regimes like 
campaign finance and state law enforcement of nonprofit organization rules. Part V analyzes this 
information and considers its implication for donor disclosure. Part VI concludes. 
 
II. TAX-EXEMPT LAW REQUIREMENTS  
 
This section describes (1) the organizations and legal elements necessary to establish for 
federal income tax purposes that an organization is (a) a social welfare organization, or (b) a 
business league, and (2) considers the individual income tax issues that are necessarily related to 
the operation of these organizations. That information logically should highlight what type of 
information would be useful for disclosure purposes on a nonprofit’s information return filed 
with the IRS. Specifically, this part focuses upon whether the legal questions raised by this 
activity raises a need for the disclosure of donor names and addresses. 
 
A. Social Welfare Organization Requirements 
 
It is hard to describe social welfare organizations succinctly. It includes health 
maintenance organizations, civic-minded social clubs like the Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, 
homeowners’ associations, kid’s sports clubs, and a bevy of advocacy organizations.34 The 
                                                          
31 Id. 
32 Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000 (2018), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 973 (2021). 
33 Brief for Petitioner, Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 973 (2021). 
34 JEREMY KHOULISH, FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS: THE HISTORY, ANATOMY AND ACTIVITY OF 501(C)(4) 
ORGANIZATIONS, URBAN INSTITUTE, 6 (2016) [hereinafter FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS]. 




section exempts from the income tax: “Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but 
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare . . . and no part of the net earnings of 
such entity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”35 Based on those 
organizations who report to the IRS on Form 990, in 2016 social welfare organizations as an 
aggregate held over $140 billion in assets, $62 billion in liabilities and earned $115 billion in 
revenue.36 Of that revenue, $7 billion came through contributions. 
There are two primary tax benefits to contributing money to a social welfare 
organization. First, any earnings of the nonprofit are exempt from the income tax as long as not 
derived from an unrelated business.37 Second, contributions of appreciated property are not taxed 
to the contributor as they would be if contributed to a political organization.38 There are others as 
well. The gift tax does not apply to contributions to social welfare organizations.39 
To qualify for these tax benefits, the Code section requires the organization to operate 
exclusively to promote social welfare and prohibits inurement to any “private shareholder or 
individual.”40 Although the Code states that a social welfare organization must operate 
“exclusively” for social welfare purposes the Treasury regulations interpret that term to mean 
“primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the 
people of the community.” Another way of stating the quantitative part of test is the “presence of 
a single substantial non-exempt purpose precludes exempt status regardless of the number or 
importance of the exempt purposes that the existence of a single substantial.”41  
Though a search turns up no court cases challenging a social welfare organization’s tax 
status because of inurement, there are related charitable organization cases under section 
501(c)(3) looking at the question.42 The term "private shareholder or individual" refers to 
persons who have a “personal and private interest in the payor organization,”43 and “does not 
refer to unrelated third parties.”44 The focus of private shareholders is on “founders or 
controlling members [who] have a personal stake in that organization's receipts.”45 Substantial 
contributors to nonprofits are often the founders of the organization and typically have some 
‘controlling stake’ in the organization. 
In addition to primary requirements to qualify as a social welfare organization, Congress 
in effect penalizes social welfare organizations that provide “excess benefits” to individuals who 
                                                          
35 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4). Treas. Reg. 26 U.S.C. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(1) makes clear that either type of organization 
must be organized and operated not for profit and exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. 
36 IRS Statistics of Income on Charitable and Tax-Exempt Organizations. https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-
charities-and-other-tax-exempt-organizations-statistics   
37 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(4), 511, 512. 
38 26 U.S.C. § 84. 
39 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(6). 
40 Congress added 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(4)(B) to include this provision in P.L. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) 
(Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2) § 1311(a). 
41 Contracting Plumbers Cooperative Restoration Corporation v. United States, 488 F.2d 684 (1973). See also Better 
Business Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945). 
42 American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053, 1068-69 (1989) (citing to Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 215; Retired Teachers Legal Fund v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 280, 287 (1982)). 
43 People of God Community v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 127, 133 (1980) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c); 
Gemological Institute of America v. Commissioner). 
44 Id. (citing Broadway Theatre League of Lynchburg, Va. v. United States 293 F. Supp. 346 (WD Va. 1968)). 
45 Id. (citing Founding Church of Scientology v. United States 823 F.2d 1310 (1987)). 




have substantial influence over the organization.46 Excess benefit transactions only arise from 
transfers to individuals who are considered disqualified persons under section 4958 of the Code. 
A disqualified person includes those who are “in a position to exercise substantial influence over 
the affairs of the organization.”47 One of the factors that show someone is a person of substantial 
influence is when a “person is a substantial contributor to the organization.”48 Thus, in policing 
this section, the IRS needs to know substantial contributors to the organization.49  
The regulations tell us that to further a social welfare purpose an organization must bring 
“about civic betterments and social improvements.”50 Some activities that do not qualify as 
social welfare include intervening in a political campaign and operating a social club. Also, a 
social welfare organization may not operate a type of business like one operated for profit.51 
Largely, the type of activity that seems to be prohibited is activity that provides private benefits 
for some individual(s) rather than collective ones that help a larger community.52 While an 
organization formed to clean up spills in a city port was found to be exempt,53 an organization 
formed by a group of plumbers to fulfill an obligation they individually held under New York 
Law was not found exempt from tax.54 The organization engaged in cleaning up spills made their 
services available to everyone in the port, while in Contracting Plumbers, the group only fixed 
the potholes members had the duty to repair.  
This theme of community benefit is seen again and again in the law. Because the 
endowment in Erie Endowment appeared to be the effort of one man who simply accumulated 
money and did not do much good, the court found his organization was not acting as a 
community movement.55 The court thus stated that a social welfare organization “must be a 
community movement designed to accomplish community ends.”56 Similarly, the IRS denied 
social welfare status to an organization where residents paid money for beautification or security 
related to their property.57 Nevertheless, a neighborhood association in which anyone could 
become a member, and members and nonmembers alike had access to major community goods 
and services provided by the organization qualified for exempt status.58 
                                                          
46 26 U.S.C. § 4958. 
47 26 U.S.C. § 4958(f)(1)(A). 
48 26 U.S.C. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(ii). 
49 Section 4958 is at once an operative section that influences what information we think is needed to properly judge 
a social welfare organization’s compliance with the Code and gives support for the idea of who might be a 
controlling member of the nonprofit for purposes of inurement discussed above. 
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1. 
51 Id. 
52 Contracting Plumbers Cooperative Restoration Corporation v. United States, 488 F.2d 684 (1973) (Organization 
formed to repair potholes caused by member plumbers of the corporation served a private member’s interests much 
more than the public and thus served a substantial non-exempt purpose). 
53 Rev. Rul. 79-316, 1979-2 C.B. 228. 
54 Contracting Plumbers. 
55 Id. 
56 Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151 (1963). 
57 Rev. Rul. 77-273, 1977-2 C.B. 194. See also, Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210 (group formed to improve the 
surroundings for the businesses and residents of one city block was found to not promote social welfare). 
58 Rev. Rul. 75-386, 1975-2 C. B. 211. Cf.  1980-1 C.B. 116, Rev. Rul. 80-63 (1980); Rev. Rul. 74-99, 1974-1 CB 
131 (discussing factors necessary for a homeowner’s association to qualify and finding that where that organization 
provides benefits primarily to its members is not exempt); see also PLR 200934045 (May 29, 2009) (finding that a 




Notably, a social welfare organization that carries out its purpose by breaking the law is 
not considered a social welfare organization.59 “Illegal activities, which violate the minimum 
standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society, are contrary 
to the common good and the general welfare of the people in a community and thus are not 
permissible.”60 
Many social welfare organizations are created in order to advocate in a political sense. A 
social welfare organization may engage in lobbying activities as a social welfare purpose. 
Lobbying refers to the activity of trying to get some representative body to vote for or against a 
decision that is before that body. In Revenue Ruling 68-656, the IRS approved of an organization 
that informed the public on controversial subjects and tried to influence legislation as legitimate 
social welfare activity.61 The IRS has found that advocating in a legislative sense for animal 
rights qualifies as social welfare activity62 as does advocating for the rights of the unborn.63 
Though lobbying can further a social welfare purpose, intervening in political activity 
does not.64 To intervene in a campaign means the act of encouraging people to vote for or against 
candidates for public office. Intervening can be direct or indirect. An organization who ranked 
candidates as its primary activity failed to show it was operated for social welfare purposes 
because the ranking was provided to intervene in a campaign.65 However, a social welfare 
organization can intervene in a political campaign and still qualify as a social welfare 
organization as long as it otherwise operates primarily for social welfare purposes.66 One 
challenge in this space that relates directly to the matter of campaign finance regulation 
discussed in Part IV is organizations that engage in what is often called issue advocacy. Issue 
advocacy happens when, rather than directly advocating for a candidate, an organization instead 
educates its followers about policies that closely identify a candidate the organization intends to 
support. This activity can be considered non-social welfare activity if determined to be 
intervention in a political campaign but can also be educational activity that furthers a social 
welfare purpose.67  
Where an organization primarily engages in political campaign activity, it is then 
considered for tax purposes as an organization described in section 527.68 Specifically, section 
527 applies to organizations considered political organizations.69 Political organizations are 
organizations that are organized and operated primarily for what is called an “exempt 
                                                          
common driveway agreement that benefitted only the members of the organization was not organized for social 
welfare purposes because it provided too much private benefit). 
59 Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204. 
60 Id. 
61 Rev. Rul. 68-656, 1968-2 C.B. 216. 
62 Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185. 
63 Rev. Rul. 76-81, 1976-1 C.B. 156. 
64 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). 
65 Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194. 
66 Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. 
67 See, e.g., Fed. Election Com. v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (nonprofit that educated its 
members and the public about issues related to abortion issued a voting guide that let the public know how different 
candidates had voted on matters of importance to the group). 
68 26 U.S.C. § 527. 
69 26 U.S.C. § 527(a) and (e)(1). 




function.”70 An exempt function includes the “function of influencing or attempting to influence 
the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or 
local public office or office in a political organization.”71 A section 527 organization still 
maintains a tax exempt status, but is subject to a tax on investment income.72  
A section 527 organization that anticipates generating gross receipts in excess of $25,000 
a year generally must give notice to the IRS within 24 hours of its establishment.73 Unlike social 
welfare organizations, Section 527 organizations must disclose substantial information about 
their receipts of contributions and expenditures.74 At the time Congress amended section 527 to 
include these disclosure requirements Congress also considered extending these disclosure 
obligations to social welfare organizations as well.75 But it did not. The IRS has provided 
guidance as to when certain activity is considered an exempt function activity under section 527 
for social welfare organizations as well as business leagues and labor unions.76 The analysis is 
quite similar to the assessment of when a section 501(c)(3) organization has engaged in political 
campaign intervention. If categorized as exempt function activity, the organization is subject to 
the tax under section 527(f). An organization described in section 501(c) could alternatively 
create a segregated fund to operate as a political organization under 527.77 
 
 
B. Business League Requirements 
 
Section 501(c)(6) exempts from income tax “business leagues, chambers of commerce, 
real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues.”78 To form one, individuals 
contribute money to a nonprofit corporation set up with a mission to further the business interests 
of the people who make up the field. These organizations are made up of national or state 
industry or professional groups that operate to advertise and to advocate the general interests of 
those in the business along with chambers of commerce who broadly advocate for business 
interests.79 They also tend to provide networking opportunities for their members.80 Under the 
Treasury regulations an organization must be formed to promote a common business interest and 
must direct its activities towards the improvement of business conditions in one or more lines of 
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business as distinguished from the performance of particular services for individual persons.81 A 
business league fails to further a proper purpose where it pursues for profit type activity or 
services for particular members.82   
Just like a social welfare organization, a business league may not allow its earnings to 
inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.83 Also, like social welfare 
organizations, while lobbying is permitted as legitimate business league activity,84 intervening in 
a campaign is not considered an activity that furthers a business league purpose. The discussion 
in Part II(A) above regarding section 527 organizations applies equally to business leagues. A 
business league that intervenes in a campaign too much becomes a political organization and 
must then disclose information regarding contributions and expenditures.85 
What qualifies as a business purpose is broad. The tax court has stated that business 
“embraces everything about which a person can be employed.”86 In addition to manufacturing, 
retail, and professions, even students of a particular profession can form an organization devoted 
to promoting business.87 Similarly, what “promotes” business is interpreted broadly. While 
neither providing a facility for members for lunch nor networking solely to exchange business 
prospect information promotes business interests,88 hosting lunch meetings to discuss business 
issues, publishing a newspaper, and holding semi-annual meetings to discuss technical problems 
with information data sharing all qualify.89 Other typical activities include “seals of 
acceptance,”90 a model building and construction code,91 and negotiating with labor.92  
Again, not unlike social welfare organizations, a business league must not be operated to 
benefit private interests. While not all benefits to members are problematic, benefits provided 
solely to members clearly are forbidden. For instance, the American Automobile Association, an 
association of individual car owners, was not described in section 501(c)(6) because provided 
services solely to members.93 Also, providing rebates to members alone is not considered a 
benefit to a larger community that proves a collective purpose.94 The IRS often denies status as a 
section 501(c)(6) organization on the basis that the applicant is allowing earnings to inure to the 
benefit of a member or members.95 In one revenue ruling, the IRS held “a business league which 
                                                          
81 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)–1 
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)–1 
83 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6). 
84 Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117. 
85 26 U.S.C. § 527(j). 
86 Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Comm’r, 7 T.C. 1449, 1465 (1946). 
87 Rev. Rul. 77-112, 1977-1 C.B. 149. 
88 Rev. Rul. 70-244, 1970-1 C.B. 132; Rev. Rul. 59-391, 1959-2 C.B. 151. 
89 Rev. Rul. 67-295, 1967-2 C.B. 197. 
90 Rev. Rul. 70-187, 1970-1 C.B. 131. 
91 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-17-004 (Jan. 1, 1981). 
92 Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Comm’r, 7 T.C. 1449, 1465 (1946), acq. 1947-1 C.B. 1. 
93 Am. Auto. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 1146, 1157–61 (1953). 
94 Mich. Mobile Home & Recreational Vehicle Inst. v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 770, 777–78 (1976). 
95 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201018015 (Dec. 15, 2009); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201237021 (June 19, 2012). Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201242016 
(July 27, 2012). Guide Int'l Corp. v. United States 90-2441 KANNE 19910000 CA7 68 AFTR 2d 91-5907, 948 F2d 
360, 91-2 USTC ¶50573 Guide Int'l Corp. v. United States, 948 F2d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 1991). “the primary benefit 
inures to IBM [International Business Machines, Inc.], which is only a segment (70 percent to 75 percent) of the 
mainframe computer business, not a line of business.”  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201420021 (Feb. 19, 2014).     In Priv. Ltr. 




extends financial aid and welfare services to its members does not qualify for exemption under 
section 501(c)(6).”96  
The IRS has said that inurement in the business league context involves “an expenditure 
of organizational funds resulting in a benefit which is beyond the scope of the benefits which 
logically flow from the organization's performance of its exempt functions.”97 Intriguingly, there 
is not a prohibition on returning assets to members upon the closing of a business league.98 
As an additional protection against using a tax-exempt entity to support a private 
business, the regulations require business leagues to promote a line of business rather than some 
particular brand.99 In National Muffler Dealer Association, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme 
Court provided an extensive legislative and regulatory history of the Code section.100 The Court 
suggests Congress took into consideration comments from the Chamber of Commerce and others 
that Congress should exempt organizations of business associations who promote business “not 
in the narrow sense of advantage to the individual, but in the broad sense of building up the trade 
and commerce of the community as a whole . . . .”101 A line of business involves “either an entire 
industry or all components of an industry within a geographic area.”102 As an example of a line 
of business case, in the 2000s, the IRS successfully denied exemption to an organization formed 
to promote Bluetooth the brand itself rather than the product in general.103 Bluetooth technology 
was found by the court to not be a line of business.104   
Engaging in a business for profit does not qualify as promoting a line of business. 
Although a business league can advertise the line of business, it cannot advertise for specific 
members.105 The IRS has stated that the legal question is whether the activity or service “relieves 
the member of the necessity of securing the service commercially (or performing the service on 
an individual basis) in order to properly conduct the member’s business, resulting in a 
convenience or economy to the member.”106 
Finally, like social welfare organizations, business leagues are also prohibited from 
engaging in illegal activity. Though there are no cases or direct IRS guidance documents on 
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point, the Office of the Chief Counsel in a General Counsel Memorandum opined that the 
illegality doctrine applied.107 The Counsel reasoned that it ought to apply particularly given that 
the doctrine applies to the similar section 501(c)(5) labor organizations.108 The most typical 
situation where illegality might be involved occurs where the business league engages in illegal 
anti-trust activity.109 The IRS has denied exemption to a section 501(c)(16) farmers’ cooperative 
on the grounds of illegality because it was engaged in distributing marijuana.110 Also, the IRS 
has placed the question of whether a business league can distribute marijuana and obtain a tax 
exemption on the no-rule list, meaning the IRS is not providing taxpayers guidance on that issue 
at this time. 
Thus, substantial contributor information is particularly relevant for business leagues as 
to the question of inurement. It additionally has significant relevance in providing the IRS 
information about whether the business league is providing some significant private benefit to 
substantial contributors. Finally, it likely provides probative evidence as to whether there are 
some improper business league activities whether that be running a business for profit or 
carrying out illegal activities. 
 
C. Other Tax Law Considerations 
 
The IRS oversight of tax-exempt organizations is not solely about the nonprofit 
organizations themselves. The rules regarding tax-exemption are written presumably to shape a 
well-functioning nonprofit sector, that is deserving of the subsidy from an exemption from 
income tax.111 However, and naturally, in allowing certain activities to escape a tax, there is 
potential for abuse of the tax system by individuals and entities. Thus, the tax-exempt rules are 
established to keep improper activity out of the sector and to root out those who are earning 
income that should be taxable. Private business activity that allows an individual to support their 
livelihood, their personal consumption, should presumably not get the benefit of an exemption 
from tax. Many typically think of the abuse of the charitable contribution deduction112 as the 
most likely way individuals might take advantage of the tax-exempt arena, but the exemption 
from income tax is quite a powerful benefit as well if the organization is designed to supply the 
consumption needs of private individuals. This section thus focuses briefly on the fact that tax 
regulation of nonprofits is not just about nonprofits, but also about ensuring federal individual 
taxes are collected and not avoided.   
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Tax exempt organizations are given a significant benefit in that any retained earnings are 
not subject to the income tax in the way such earnings are subject to tax in any other business 
entity, corporate or pass-through. This is typically considered a subsidy equal to the rate of tax 
times the annual profit of the tax-exempt entity.113 An individual who can find a way to earn 
money in a tax-exempt entity, not pay tax on those earnings, and later distribute money to 
themselves has designed a means of avoiding taxation, even if just by making use of the time 
value of money. This would function like a traditional retirement account with exemption on 
contributions and earnings but taxation upon withdrawal. The retirement plan holder receives 
significant tax savings as a result. A nonprofit could also be designed to deliver its services and 
goods directly to its members. For instance, an organization that maintains a lake primarily for 
private residents and not the public would be providing consumption benefits to its members 
without taxation of the activity. The point to be made here is that nonprofit oversight is not just 
about ensuring that a nonprofit is operated properly but that individuals associated with the 
nonprofit are not avoiding the individual income tax through the tax-exempt organization. 
 Income tax is not the only tax involved. Social welfare organizations and business 
leagues can receive gifts during the lifetime of a taxpayer that are not subject to the gift tax.114 
Under these circumstances, if the organization is not operating as a legitimate social welfare 
organization or business league, the IRS ought to be able to set aside an untaxed gift to such 
organizations. Knowledge of substantial contributors to social welfare organizations and 
business leagues can allow the IRS to properly regulate the gift tax. 
In understanding the law in the advocacy and political activity space it is useful to also 
consider the treatment of lobbying and political activity for deduction purposes. Section 162 of 
the Code prohibits taxpayers from deducting either lobbying or political campaign related 
expenses.115 Up until 1962, Treasury regulations prohibited the deduction of any lobbying 
expenses. The Supreme Court upheld this position in Cammarano v. Commissioner.116 In 1962, 
Congress modestly changed that result and allowed the deduction of expenses that directly 
lobbied on issues germane to the taxpayer. Nevertheless, in 1993, the Clinton administration was 
successful in passing a new law to again prohibit the deduction of these expenses.117 A donor can 
donate appreciated assets to a social welfare organization and a business league without 
incurring a tax on the gain. If the social welfare organization or business league uses those 
appreciated assets to carry out lobbying or intervention in a political campaign, the donor has 
found a way of deducting a significant amount of gain.  
To conclude, it is clear that the IRS’s role in overseeing tax-exempt organizations is not 
just about the operation of these organizations where who contributed what does not matter. It is 
about ensuring the fairness of the entirety of the Code. Thus, even if there was no use for donor 
names and addresses for assessment of tax exemption requirements, there would still be reason 
to properly enforce the Code and collect the revenue. The information can allow the IRS to look 
for and better spot when wealthy individuals are connected to a nonprofit and may be using it to 
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direct goods and services that substantial contributor’s way. Of course, this in turn can tell 
whether the nonprofit qualifies for its particular tax-exempt status. 
 
III. INFORMATION RETURN & REPORTING MATTERS 
 
As discussed in the Introduction there are a couple of functions the nonprofit information 
tax return the Form 990 serves: (1) it provides broad disclosure to the public and other 
constituencies to hold nonprofits publicly accountable, and (2) it serves an information reporting 
role to help the IRS to enforce the tax law both against the nonprofit organization and the people 
with whom the nonprofit organization transacts business. Function (1), is not a significant part of 
the role of donor disclosure because donor names and addresses were not generally publicly 
disclosed; they were only provided to the IRS. However, because function (1) is such an 
important role of the Form 990 today, I discuss it in section A. I return to that function again in 
section D to consider the implications of political justice for the reporting of substantial donor 
information. Section B considers that the Form 990 is not just an information return but also 
serves an information reporting function as well. Section C turns to the current enforcement 
environment and evaluates the implications that has for the necessity of methods of enforcement 
other than human resource intensive audits. 
 
A. Information Return Requirements  
 
Congress directs all organizations exempt from income tax under section 501(a) of the 
Code to file an annual information return “stating specifically the items of gross income, 
receipts, and disbursements, and such other information for the purpose of carrying out the 
internal revenue laws” as the Secretary may prescribe.118 Both social welfare organizations and 
business leagues are exempt from tax under that section so they must file the Form 990 
implemented by the IRS.119 In the regulations under section 6033, the IRS and the Treasury 
Department prescribe certain requirements that must be a part of the return.120 For instance, the 
regulations require the disclosure of gross income, dues, expenses, disbursements, the balance 
sheet as of the beginning and end of the year, the names of officers and directors, and more.121 
The IRS and the Treasury Department enacted a regulation in 1942 requiring tax-exempt 
organizations to file a Form 990 for tax years beginning in 1941.122 It required charitable 
organizations (with the exception of religious organizations), social welfare organizations, and 
business leagues among others to file the new return.123 In 1944, Congress implemented a tax-
exempt organization information return legislatively, but excepted from the requirement many 
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types of charitable organizations such as religious organizations and publicly supported 
charities.124 Rather than seeing these returns as a matter of compliance with tax-exemption, the 
legislative history suggests Congress was concerned that tax-exempt charities had an unfair 
advantage over for-profit businesses in carrying out business activities and thought it important 
to collect information to inform Congress and the public about the extent of this problem.125 
There was no publicity requirement at that time.  
In the initial Form 990 in 1942 for the 1941 tax year, the IRS required the donor 
information from tax-exempt organizations.126 Congress later statutorily required this donor 
information from charitable organizations in the 1969 Tax Act.127 Though Congress has decided 
to require tax exempt organizations to make a lot of information public, Congress prohibits the 
public disclosure of the names and addresses of contributors of all but private foundations and 
political organizations.128 On the Form 990, the organization must list the amount of 
“contributions” made to the organization in Part VIII line 1 of the Form. The Instructions state 
that contributions include gifts, grants, or other similar amounts. It does not include fees for 
services.129  
The Treasury Department and the IRS gave the Commissioner the authority in the 
regulations to relieve any organization in whole or in part from the requirements to file a 
return.130 Over the years, the IRS exercised this relief authority provided to the Commissioner 
through revenue procedures.131 In 2018, the IRS moved to relieve all exempt organizations 
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except charitable ones from the donor disclosure requirements in a revenue procedure.132 After a 
federal district court in Bullock found the IRS had violated the Administrative Procedure Act by 
changing its rule without going through the notice and comment process,133 Treasury and the 
IRS instead enacted the elimination of this donor information through regulations.134  
In the final regulations, the IRS simply says that it does not believe it needs the donor 
name and address information in order to police private benefit rules discussed above in Part I.135 
It argued that it needed the information primarily on examination and that it could easily obtain 
that information at that stage. In considering the matter the IRS accepted that disclosure of this 
particular donor information was sensitive and should remain private in part because such 
disclosure could lead to harassment of donors. It concluded that not requiring the information 
would cut down on inadvertent disclosure.136 Finally, the IRS concluded that the compliance 
burden could be reduced by not having to report information that is not needed. Though it admits 
that it at times has a duty to coordinate with other agencies on matters of campaign finance, the 
IRS roundly rejects the idea that its job includes enforcing campaign finance laws.137 It stakes 
out a similar position with respect to the request that it maintain this information for purposes of 
aiding state enforcement: state enforcement is not in the job description of the IRS.138 In the end 
though, the IRS requires these organizations to maintain this information for purposes of a later 
examination.139 
Congress decided in 1950 to make Form 990’s accessible to the public,140 and in 1958, 
Congress amended section 6104 of the Code to require disclosure of applications for exemption 
and Forms 990 to interested parties who sought those in person at IRS offices, where those 
returns were available for inspection.141 In 1969, witnesses testifying to Congress suggested that 
nonprofits be required to provide extensive information to be publicized for the purpose of public 
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accountability and ease of IRS review and audit of these organizations.142 Thus, by 1969 there is 
recognition that the role of the Form 990 is both for purposes of IRS audit and for ensuring a 
greater public accountability through public disclosure. Congress made Form 990s even more 
available to the public in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA '87).143 Prior 
to 1987 a party interested in these returns had to formally request these documents from the 
IRS.144 
The public disclosure of the returns arguably brings “some measure of organizational 
accountability to various constituencies, including current and prospective donors, organization 
employees and patrons, other exempt entities, and the citizenry at large.”145 As Professor Evelyn 
Brody notes, the disclosure of the Form 990 acts as a tool for nonprofit directors to have access 
to information they should receive but otherwise might not have gotten.146 The Joint Committee 
on Taxation has suggested “[d]isclosure of information regarding tax-exempt organizations also 
allows the public to determine whether the organizations should be supported - either through 
continued tax benefits and contributions of donors - and whether changes in the laws regarding 
such organizations are needed.”147 The Independent Sector offers another reason: the unique role 
of nonprofits in our society as voluntary organizations necessitates a higher level of public 
disclosure of these organizations’ activities.148 Within the for-profit corporate context there is a 
movement for public disclosure of their tax returns as well. The proponents there argue it helps 
“detect questionable tax positions, deter the managers of a corporation from pursuing aggressive 
tax strategies for fear of public shaming and educate the public regarding the corporate tax 
law.”149  
There is evidence that an information return requirement is no panacea on its own 
without significant IRS oversight to ensure its being carried out properly. The U.S. General 
Accounting Office (“GAO”) considered private foundation reporting in 1983 and found that IRS 
oversight was lacking.150 The study found that private foundations often left off important public 
                                                          
142 Id. at 214. 
143 Pub. L. 100-203, Title X, § 10702(a), 101 Stat. 1330-459 (Dec. 22, 1987). 
144 Lloyd H. Mayer, Minimizing Risks and Maximizing Benefits Under the Final Disclosure Regs. For Exempt 
Organizations, 91 J. Tax’n 45 (1999).  
145 Caroline K. Craig, The Internet Brings ‘Cyber-Accountability’ to the Nonprofit Sector, 13 J. TAX’N EX. ORG. 82 
(2001). 
146 Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. 
TAX REV. 183, 194 (2012). 
147 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 106th Cong., STUDY OF DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, at 5 (2000) (hereinafter STUDY OF DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS). See also Lloyd Hitoshi 
Mayer, The Promises and Perils of Using Big Data to Regulate Nonprofits, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1281, 1297-98 
(2019). 
148 Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. 
TAX REV. 183, 212 (2012). 
149 Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31, 48–49 (2014). The initial 
corporate income tax required public disclosure of corporate tax returns. Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 
36 Stat. 11, 116.; see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 
66 IND. L.J. 53, 57 (1991). 
150 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, CONSUMER, AND 
MONETARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS: PUBLIC INFORMATION REPORTING BY TAX-
EXEMPT PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS NEEDS MORE ATTENTION BY IRS (Sept. 26, 1983). 




information on their filed returns that could better ensure public accountability.151 In discussing 
the importance of the Form 990PF in public accountability of private foundations, the GAO 
stated:  
 
In addition to using private foundation information to research grants, the public 
also needs the data to evaluate foundation activities. The Congress, when 
considering the public reporting requirements established by the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969, reasoned that foundations would be more likely to act in the public’s 
interest if they were required to fully disclose their activities.152 
 
The Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”) considered the question of when information 
should be publicly disclosable.153 A key piece of this report is that the JCT analysis focuses on 
public disclosure regarding charitable organizations, and not return information provided solely 
to government officials. The JCT expressed the opinion that publicly disclosed information 
supported both organizations operating within their dedicated exempt purpose and the proper 
administration of Federal tax laws.154 However, it thought there was a need to assess whether 
certain types of information should be disclosable. For instance, there were compelling reasons 
to maintain the secrecy of private information about donors.155 To them: “donors have legitimate 
privacy concerns, and that disclosure of donor identity may reduce charitable giving. Such 
information generally is not relevant in determining whether the organization is complying with 
the law, or in determining whether the organization is accomplishing its exempt purposes.”156 I 
obviously question the final two premises in this article but acknowledge the potential privacy 
concerns of donors and the potential of public disclosure impacting charitable giving and turn to 
that concern in Part III(C) and (D).  
 
B. Information Reporting. 
 
It is a bit odd to think of information provided on a tax information return such as the 
Form 990 as part of the idea of information reporting. What do I mean by that? An information 
return on the one hand, discussed above in this Part III(A), is an actual return that relates directly 
to the party filing the tax return. In the case of a tax-exempt organization, the Form 990 is an 
information return that provides information about the nonprofit organization itself directly to the 
government to ensure the organization is fulfilling its particular exempt purpose. Information 
reporting, on the other hand, is the idea that the government can make some third-party that has 
access to information about a transaction report that transaction to the government. For example, 
Congress requires employers to report wages paid to employees on a Form W-2, and financial 
institutions to report dividends, interest, capital gains and other passive investment income paid 
to investors on a Form 1099. This reporting arguably provides greater integrity to the tax 
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collection system by making the tax system harder to evade,157 and also can provide the IRS 
information that will help the IRS better target noncompliance in the future.158 Form 990 fulfills 
both functions. It provides important information about transfers of money and transactions the 
nonprofit entered into with insiders and outsiders. This section C considers the potential value of 
information reporting and how that might relate to the Form 990 and donor disclosure. 
There is a robust literature on the importance of information reporting to tax collection.159 
“It is widely known . . .  that tax enforcement is excellent whenever such third-party reporting is 
in place, and that enforcement is weak even in the most advanced economies when such third-
party reporting is not in place, as in the case of small family businesses.”160 The theoretical basis 
of why taxpayers comply is for the most part based in an expected utility model.161 Taxpayers 
consider the benefit from avoidance and the likelihood of detection. When a third-party reports a 
transaction the likelihood of detection is high.162 
Some authors detail problems with what they refer to as “overdisclosure”. For instance, 
in the tax shelter arena the IRS has asked for enormous amounts of information that some label 
as a problem of overdisclosure.163 In these instances, risk-averse taxpayers spend too much time 
disclosing every transaction, as do aggressive taxpayers looking to paper over their tax shelter 
activity, leading the IRS to proceed down audit trails that are far from targeted.164 Other critics 
such as Professor Wei Cui suggest that there is a lack of causation between information reporting 
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and compliance.165 However, Professor Cui still believes information reporting plays a real role 
in compliance in an income tax regime.166 
In the United States, information reporting’s perhaps most palpable role is in reducing the 
tax gap, i.e., the amount of income tax actually owed by the public but not voluntarily paid. The 
tax gap is estimated to be between 15-18% of tax owed.167 In the 2008-2010 period, the IRS 
failed to collect $458 billion in tax. After some compliance efforts by the IRS that amount was 
later narrowed to $406 billion. The Treasury Department in a study of tax compliance notes that 
tax noncompliance is the highest where there is no third-party reporting.168 The Treasury 
Department highlights the need to “strengthen reporting requirements,”169 and notes that 
enforcement activity itself is not a driver of reducing the tax gap.170 In its 2001 study, the IRS 
found that 45% of compliance has to do with information reporting.171 
The difficulty the IRS faces is asymmetric information. The taxpayer has information that 
the IRS does not. The reason reporting can be so effective is that it does not require the IRS to do 
all or even much of the work. As Professor Leandra Lederman notes, like a red light camera, 
simply the fact that an individual is being watched can generate compliant behavior.172 
Lederman suggests there are six factors to consider in any information reporting arrangement: 
(1) arm's-length parties, (2) bookkeeping infrastructure, (3) centralization, (4) complete 
reporting, (5) few alternative arrangements, and (6) contributor to tax gap.173 Lederman 
considers a proposal by Professors Soled and Gans to require reporting of gifts for gift tax 
purposes. She rejects this proposal because the parties typically are unsophisticated such that 
reporting would be a burden and the gift tax does not contribute much to the tax gap.174  
Where transaction parties are engaging at arm’s-length, the IRS has reason to believe that 
there is little reason for the parties to collude in reporting.175 Thus, information reporting in these 
circumstances is highly reliable. Congress has recognized, though, that where parties are related, 
it is hard to have faith in the reporting and in the tax positions taken.176 Congress often adopts 
anti-abuse provisions to stop people from taking advantage of these situations. Professor 
Lederman notes that the IRS needs to look particularly closely at situations where there is a tax 
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indifferent party who can take much of the income and allow others a deduction.177 Tax-exempt 
organizations are just such parties. Lederman suggests that in these types of situations 
information reporting might not be all that useful as the third party has reason to provide 
improper information.  
Lederman’s factors 2 and 3 are strongly encouraging of information reporting regarding 
donor names and addresses. In the context of nonprofit organizations who are already required to 
file a substantial tax return and keep the additional information, the bookkeeping costs of 
including substantial donor names and addresses would seem to be very small. There are likely 
some gains in centralization of reporting at the nonprofit level rather than asking each donor to 
provide such reporting. Factor 5 certainly does not weigh against information reporting as tax 
exempt organizations by definition need a contributory relationship with its members rather than 
a transactional one. 
Finally, factors 4 and 6 cut against information reporting in this donor information 
context. Professor Lederman notes the importance of complete reporting in factor 4, which she 
says means that the IRS is provided all the information needed and that information easily aligns 
with traceable information on a taxpayer’s return.178 In general, adding donor addresses and 
names does not easily align with information that the IRS can make simple use of in tracing 
whether amounts were correctly deducted or included in income. It is information that the IRS 
has to work to use to understand a complex relationship between the taxpayer and the nonprofit. 
But substantial donors are often at the heart of a (non)compliant tax-exempt organization. So, it 
tells the IRS about critical information. It is almost surely correct that this information plays little 
role in solving factor 6, the tax gap. Given that the IRS declares it rarely uses the information, it 
seems to follow that the information has rarely played a part in closing the tax gap. Perhaps we 
should not give this factor much power in this context since no tax-exempt entity plays a 
significant role in collecting tax in the first place. 
 
C. Enforcement Environment 
 
In considering whether to include an item for purposes of an information return or for 
information reporting, it is worth assessing the enforcement environment. By that I mean what 
resources does the IRS have at its disposal to ensure taxpayers are complying with the law. If the 
IRS has limited resources, it arguably ought to put a higher priority on devices that enforce the 
law without resort to human resources, i.e., agents on the ground, to enforce that law. A review 
of the trend over the past 10 years suggests the IRS does not have the resources, human or 
capital, needed to enforce the current tax law.179 
The IRS budget has shrunk over the past decade. The Congressional Budget Office 
(“CBO”) reports that between 2010 and 2018 the IRS budget fell by 20% in real (inflation 
adjusted) dollars.180 As that CBO report detailed, this budget cut to the IRS resulted in a 22% 
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decrease in employees working at the agency, but alarmingly a 30% decline in enforcement 
employees.181 IRS Data Books show the IRS went from over 94,000 full time equivalent 
(“FTEs”) employees in FY 2010 to 73,554 FTEs in FY 2019.182 Furthermore, some of the most 
specialized employees in the enforcement sphere saw declines of 35% for revenue agents and 
48% for revenue officers.183 The CBO details the impact this had on taxpayer examinations. 
Individual examinations fell by 46% in that period with only 0.6% of individuals facing an 
examination by the end of that period.184 While high income individuals were generally audited 
at a rate higher than other individuals, the audits of high-income individuals fell at a greater rate 
than all other individuals.185 Corporate examinations fell by 37%.186  
As discussed above, the tax gap is large. In the period from 2011-2013 the IRS estimates 
the annual tax gap was approximately $441 billion.187 It also expects that collection activity by 
the IRS will return about $60 billion lost dollars bringing the tax gap down to $381 billion. 
Though the IRS has not yet estimated the tax gap for later years, one group, Shrink the Tax Gap, 
estimates the tax gap in 2019 increased to $574 billion.188 
What does this shrinking enforcement environment look like in the tax-exempt 
organization sector? The group that oversees this sector in the IRS is referred to as Tax-Exempt 
& Government Entities and within that division, the exempt organizations group focuses on this 
tax-exempt sector. The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) in 2014 recognized that the 
budget cuts at the IRS led to less enforcement in the tax-exempt sector.189 The IRS workforce on 
exempt organization matters shrank about 5% from 2010 (889 FTEs) to 2013 (842 FTEs).190 
That workforce then shrank significantly to around 550 FTEs by FY 2019.191 There was a 
change in the exempt organizations group at the IRS after the Tea Party controversy of 2013 
where many employees of exempt organizations moved over to the Chief Counsel to manage 
guidance projects from that office. In 2014, it was reported that around 45 employees from the 
IRS were being moved over to the Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS in a realignment.192 
However, even if 45 moved over, that does not explain the precipitous drop.  
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The exempt organizations group at the IRS carries on several functions but the main two 
are running an application system called the determinations process, and an examination 
program. The predominate group of the 550 employees are divided into those two functions. In 
determinations, as annual applications have increased annual rejections from the IRS have 
significantly decreased.193 In FY 2019, the IRS reviewed over 101,000 applications for exempt 
status, it rejected only 66 of those applications.194 Comparatively, in FY 2010, the IRS reviewed 
over 65,000 such applications and rejected 517.195 When looking at examinations, it is 
impossible to have a perfect figure given the way the data is reported in the IRS Data Book, but 
of all the returns filed and all the returns examined, which likely includes some double counting 
of organizations (and includes sizable employment tax returns), the IRS had about a 1.5% 
examination rate. In 2019, comparatively, even with the double counting problem, the 
examination rate shrinks to 0.05% at best.196 
This drastic shrinkage of the IRS happened while the tax-exempt sector grew 
significantly. It is a large sector. Though the comparison between 2010 and 2019 suggests that 
the tax-exempt organization groups shrunk from a little more than 1.9 million to a little less than 
1.9 million tax-exempt organizations according to IRS Data Books,197 the sector has grown in 
size of assets. It is difficult to get good current statistics on nonprofits. There are many problems 
with the data from the IRS including the fact that not all organizations file returns (churches for 
instance) and we have no reason to believe all organizations file their returns accurately. 
Nevertheless, a look at the raw file of data from the IRS of information reported on Forms 990 
suggests assets and revenue have increased significantly in the sector over the decade.198 In 
2010, with just the charitable sector, with a little over 186,000 Form 990s filed, the sector held 
over $2.9 trillion in assets (though 1.17 trillion in liabilities) and almost $1.6 trillion in 
revenue.199 In comparison, in 2017 that same charitable sector filed over 217,000 Form 990s 
reporting over $4.3 trillion in assets (over $1.5 trillion in liabilities) and almost $2.3 trillion in 
revenue.200 Using that same data, again from reporting on Forms 990, for exempt organizations 
including 501(c)(4)-(9) in 2010 there were approximately $547 billion in assets and $360 billion 
in revenue.201 In 2017, those amounts grew to approximately $767 billion in assets and $387 
billion in revenue.202 
Thus, the enforcement environment for the IRS is poor both at the IRS in general and at 
the division that oversees tax-exempt organizations in particular. When compared to the size of 
the sector the IRS is reviewing, the idea that the IRS might be able to use human resource heavy 
examinations to ensure compliance is simply laughable. It is not going to work. As will be 
discussed in Part (IV)(C), state enforcement is even more anemic. Efforts, such as those 
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recommended by GAO, for the IRS to make better use of data available is going to be the only 
way the IRS in this current environment can make headway against tax abuse. Robust 
information reporting thus needs to be the norm. 
 
D. Democratic Function of Disclosure  
 
I previously argued that political justice as democracy is a key piece in constructing tax 
policy.203 The importance of the value of political justice as a matter of tax policy is not just a 
matter of the choice of tax instrument, the progressive nature of the tax structure, nor of ensuring 
such justice at the substantive level of the Code,204 but a matter of equitable enforcement as well. 
Political justice should be a value that guides required tax reporting. There are two matters 
associated with this donor disclosure that are relevant to political justice: (1) it is important to a 
democratic order that information necessary to make collective decisions be publicly available, 
and (2) it is important to a democratic order that citizens see justice in the sense that alike 
situations are treated in a like manner. In this section, I will very briefly discuss the principles of 
democracy, then focus on the case for public disclosure and the need for justice to be seen. There 
are some complications in the end to this second factor, which I discuss at the end of this Part 
III(D). 
The two democratic values implicate different policy aspects of donor disclosure. First, to 
the extent a nonprofit engages in lobbying and political campaign activity there may be reason 
for the public to know who is funding those initiatives from a political justice perspective. In 
order to make collective governmental decisions in a democracy it is important that each citizen 
have the information relevant to making those collective decisions. Knowing who is supporting 
lobbying and political campaign activity can be important information in that regard. Extending 
the import of this first informational value, the public may also have an interest in disclosure that 
is broader than that which we call government. I suggest here that it should extend to those 
organizations that provide collective goods or services. Obviously, as discussed in Part III(A), 
many including Congress have considered nonprofit activity to be important enough to require 
these organizations to broadly disclose their activities on the Form 990.  
Secondly, the disclosure of this information allows individuals to see justice being carried 
out or not carried out in the very organizations that are allowed to operate as tax-exempt entities. 
Are these organizations worthy of the government subsidy we bestow upon them? Did the IRS 
operate in an unbiased manner in picking these organizations? This second value then resonates 
strongly in ensuring a well-enforced tax code where the wealthy are bearing their real burden.  
The case for democracy is based on the principle of intrinsic equality.205 That potent idea 
supports the notion that all individuals ought to have an equal say in what a relevant group 
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decides to do, and strongly suggests democracy as a governing principle. As Professor Christiano 
explains, “[a] person’s right to participate in the shaping of the world she shares in common with 
others, which characterizes a well-functioning democracy, is grounded in her fundamental 
interests as a member of political society.”206 This fundamental principle is central to both the 
case for public disclosure and the need for justice to be seen.207 
Under democracy, each member of the relevant group must have an equal and real 
opportunity to have a say in the agenda of the group and in final decisions of the group. This 
means individuals must be provided the right to ask questions and provide relevant information 
and arguments such that all individuals have an opportunity to understand the consequences of a 
decision at issue. Additionally, everyone must have a vote in any final decision of the group. An 
important additional element to the principles of democracy is that equality must be seen, it must 
be publicly realized.208 Institutions “must be able to display the fact of their justice to ordinary 
persons.”209 In Part III (A) and (B) above I explored disclosure to the public and disclosure to the 
government itself. I try to explore those two themes within their political justice context in this 
Part III(D).  
Immanuel Kant notes a major problem in organizing a state is to “organize a group of 
rational beings who together require universal laws for their survival, but of who each separate 
individual is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them.”210 In her book looking at the role of 
secrets in society and the ethics associated therewith, Sissela Bok notes: “Secrecy, when 
available, is peculiarly likely to increase the temptation not to cooperate with others to reduce 
shared burdens.”211 Thus, the choice to allow secrecy not only comes with the potential that 
wealthy donors might misuse that secrecy, might choose to not cooperate with the body politic, 
but that it is also possible that this move is seen as a move to not do equal justice. 
The only way we can each know that we are getting equal respect in our polity is if that 
equality is public. The Supreme Court in effect recognized this value in campaign finance rules 
in Buckley v. Valeo as an informational benefit that “allows voters to place each candidate in the 
political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and 
campaign speeches” and “alerts the voter to the interest of which a candidate is most likely to be 
responsive.”212 It also is though in the campaign finance case to protect against public 
corruption. 
That said, there are democratic theorists who argue against public disclosure in this 
campaign finance context. Ian Ayres argues that rather than the Brandeis statement “Sunlight is 
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said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman,” the right 
metaphor for thinking about disclosure for campaign finance is the secrecy of the voting 
booth.213 The catch is that he considers whether we would be better off with mandated 
anonymity. In other words, no candidate would know who supported them such that there would 
be no particular promises to keep. To Ayres, there is no difference between a public disclosure 
system and a laissez-faire system of disclosure.214 This leads him to a conclusion that a system 
more protective from public corruption would be one of mandated anonymity. The Supreme 
Court in Buckley though thought the sunlight was likely to make corruption less likely.215 That 
said, the Court has at times recognized limits on disclosure where it might legitimately be said to 
harm the donor.216 
A natural question might arise as to why we might need this publicity role in the case of 
organizations that are not explicitly governmental. Though some reasons are discussed above in 
Part III(A), it is worth reflecting on the specific democratic function of this disclosure. First, 
nonprofits are the easiest identifiable embodiment of civil society. By civil society, I mean 
organizations, public spaces, modes of communication that exist outside of either the political 
system or the economic system where people have the ability to generate information and 
opinions about collective action of society in a way that they might influence the direction of 
both economic and political society.217 In that civil society function they often interact with the 
political system to influence that system through lobbying of public officials or to support 
candidates for office through political contributions or independent expenditures. Thus, to the 
extent we find it important that our politics be subject to transparency, we ought to expect some 
similar level of transparency from our nonprofits as they substantially interact with and influence 
the political.  
If we stopped there though, thinking about the role of nonprofits explicitly carrying out 
direct roles in forming our governmental system, we might think disclosure could be limited to 
those directly engaged in lobbying and/or political campaign activity. Clearly though we have 
chosen as a country to conceive of general disclosure as important for almost the entirety of the 
nonprofit sector. This choice fits well within a broad democratically based system that 
recognizes that there are many collectively based decisions that are carried on outside of 
government. Because these nonprofits necessarily carry out collective services and provide 
collective goods, with a subsidy from the federal government through the tax system,218 I submit 
they are more public in nature and thus ought to be subject to some public disclosure regarding 
their activities for proper democratic functioning. As an additional matter, because they lack 
owners who can pursue corrective actions for misuse, it becomes important for the public to be 
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aware of their activities. Generally, it is primarily the attorney general who can protect the 
interests of nonprofit beneficiaries.219  
Without taking on the Constitutional law question, it is important to recognize that as the 
organizations are a foundation of civil society, these nonprofits engage in important free speech 
and free association activity that is critical to the health of our democracy.220 We should be 
careful in how that system is administered such that it does not destroy or hinder such free 
speech or association. Nevertheless, at the same time, democracy must be open to the sharing of 
information. 
Professor Hitoshi Mayer explores the right of the public to know and focuses specifically 
upon what he refers to as private-to-private information.221 He considers the right to know in the 
government action context one matter and then any other activities as private to private.222 By 
this he means: “interactions that directly involve only private actors but where at least one of the 
private parties intends the interaction to indirectly influence the actions or selection of 
government actors (‘private-private political interactions’).”223 Hitoshi Mayer considers 
justifications for why the public might believe it has an interest in certain information including a 
proprietary justification, an accountability justification, a democracy justification, and a 
utilitarian justification.224  
With the proprietary justification, because the public in a democracy is synonymous with 
the government, the public in effect owns the information held by the public.225 Hitoshi Mayer is 
skeptical that we could justify ownership of private-to-private information, as it would obliterate 
any notion of privacy for an individual. The accountability justification focuses on the need for 
the public to have access to public information to hold government officials accountable.226 This 
justification is strongest, he concludes when used to hinder corruption, but is fairly weak as a 
mode to increase good faith decision making.227 The democracy justification is about democratic 
legitimation – in order for citizens to make informed choices in their role as makers of law, they 
need critical information. Though he finds much theoretical support for this contention, he finds 
little empirical support that it makes a difference in the quality of democracy. Furthermore, as a 
result of its limited empirical support, he finds that it has little application to private-to-private 
communications.228  Finally, the utilitarian justification asserts that there are better social and 
economic outcomes within a society that has greater transparency.229 Because Hitoshi Mayer 
concludes the utilitarian justification lacks empirical support, he rejects it as providing strong 
support as of now. He ultimately concludes that the accountability justification provides fairly 
robust support for public disclosure of bundling of political contributions and independent 
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candidate related expenses. But he finds the justifications somewhat weak when we consider 
grassroots lobbying.230  
It is hard to know how Hitoshi Mayer’s assessment would apply to the field of social 
welfare organizations or business leagues, but it seems reasonable to surmise that Hitoshi Mayer 
would see much of the work of these two types of organizations as similar at best to grassroots 
lobbying and probably of much less public interest nature. Thus, public disclosure of donors in 
the vast majority of instances of these nonprofits would generally not be disclosable because 
private to private communications without suggestions of the possibility of corruption.231 This is 
not to say the information might not be disclosable to the IRS, or that certain type of 
communications that were independent expenditures or bundling could be disclosable, but that 
would be a narrower case than providing public disclosure of substantial donors to nonprofits 
generally.  
Professor Nichalos Stephanopoulos argues we should expand the notion of political 
activity to include what he calls quasi campaign finance that would capture more of the social 
welfare and business league activity than would perhaps Hitoshi Mayer.232 To Stephanopoulos, 
quasi campaign finance “pays for political communications with voters” but “these 
communications are nonelectoral yet rely on an electoral link to be effective.”233 This seems 
similar to what I have previously described as advocacy organizations broadly:  “those that 
lobby, are considered to intervene in a political campaign, and those that broadly advocate for a 
cause through education or legal processes.”234 Professor Roger Colinvaux goes further by 
making a broad call for disclosure of all social welfare organization relatively large donors to 
protect against the issue of political corruption and consequent harm to the tax-exempt sector.235 
To Colinvaux there is a real danger of the corruption of the nonprofit sector through politics that 
disclosure can protect against. 
The informational value for citizens to have the tools they need to make collective 
decisions is not the only value involved here. There is also the need mentioned above to see 
justice be done. Requiring these organizations that serve the collective purposes they serve to 
provide transparency regarding their operations makes good sense. It allows us all to see that a 
nonprofit organization is indeed fulfilling its exempt purpose and allows the community to hold 
it to account if it is not. However, we are only talking about the substantial donor information in 
this Article. To the extent this information crosses directly into the political at the governmental 
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level, it seems there is good reason to require this information to be public for the reasons 
discussed above. Nevertheless, it seems that the publicization of this material as we move away 
from organizations directly engaging in the political is lessened. We begin to tread more into the 
private. Even if it is necessary for enforcement purposes, perhaps privacy should trump the 
modest value this additional information would provide the public. Nevertheless, given that there 
is at least good reason for the information, the failure to collect that information may not be 
ensuring that justice is seen.  
One additional complicating factor to a democratic order, is the potential for the IRS to 
be perceived as a biased political player.236 With social welfare organizations the IRS is already 
involved in making collective choices for our society on whether a particular organizational 
purpose and activity is a “good” one that deserves tax exempt status and government 
subsidies.237 This function of the IRS violates political justice by taking away from the people 
the ability to make these decisions, and it does it in nontransparent ways because of the 
prohibition on disclosure of taxpayer information. Further though, where that call is specifically 
about whether a particular communication or organization fits into a political rubric or not, the 
IRS must make collective choices for us that resonate at a high level for our polity. Requiring the 
IRS to mandate disclosure of donors in this environment may make the IRS seem like a 
politically biased entity.  
Nevertheless, Congress would be the entity to mandate disclosure in a public sense in the 
case of nonprofits generally. That broad disclosure likely adds to political justice in that we can 
all see the types of organizations that have been approved by the IRS and how they behave and 
what they do. It makes the system more transparent. Additionally, because it is Congress that 
mandates this disclosure, some of the political accusations against the IRS might disappear. The 
same would be true were Congress to mandate disclosure of these donors. Thus, it is possible 
that disclosure of donors could be seen to promote political justice rather than the other way 
around. 
Focusing in on the narrow information involved here – substantial donors to social 
welfare organizations and business leagues – and considering the specific question of whether 
that information ought to be publicized, it seems we might have some consensus that to the 
extent the information touches the political campaign process, it would be reasonable to expect 
public disclosure. However, the further we get from the explicitly political, the harder the public 
disclosure case becomes. Nevertheless, where we can conclude that this donor information 
should be publicly shared, that provides strong support to the case that the information should be 
at least disclosed to the IRS. It may also lend greater support to the case for the IRS serving to 
support ancillary legal regimes in administering the Code discussed in Part IV. Even if the public 
could not see the donor information, at least the information is being considered in regulating 
this sector, building up a stronger sense that the second value of equal enforcement mentioned 
above of is being carried out. 
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IV. IMPORTANCE TO ANCILLARY LEGAL MATTERS 
 
There are legal regimes that are external to tax law that depend at least in part upon the 
legal regime of tax law associated with tax exempt organizations. This includes campaign 
finance systems and state law enforcement associated with nonprofit organizations. These 
different regimes may rely in part upon the IRS’s collection of donor names and addresses to 
oversee these legal regimes. When the Treasury Department sought comments on the new 
regulations eliminating the donor disclosure requirements, indeed, many commenters noted the 
importance of this disclosure to the enforcement of federal campaign finance laws. They also 
noted its importance to state enforcement of laws regarding nonprofit organizations. The IRS 
summarily rejected those as not part of the mission of IRS. The question of whether to require 
disclosure of donor information ought to at least consider the impact the failure to collect this 
information has on those other regimes. A simple statement that those other interests are not part 
of the IRS’s job is an insufficient response. This part will first look at the idea of agency 
cooperation with other agencies and state and local governments. It will then review federal 
campaign finance interests in the collection of this information. Finally, it discusses state 
interests in this information for state nonprofit law purposes. 
 
A. What Role Can Income Tax Administration Play in Enforcing Ancillary Legal 
Regimes? 
 
 The Constitution provides that the President is the chief executive officer who oversees 
that the laws are enforced.238 Thus, the President has the ability to oversee all of the laws and try 
to ensure that the bureaucracy works in tandem. Congress also clearly envisions that agencies 
can cooperate both within the federal government and outside to state government.239 Professor 
Bijal Shah highlights numerous places where Congress has explicitly granted the power and the 
expectation for agencies to cooperate with another in ensuring external laws to that agency are 
enforced.240 For instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation may “reach into any other agency 
to augment its own resources to pursue fraud cases.” The Consumer Product Safety Commission 
may “gather any data from any agency it chooses, as long as it deems this information 
‘necessary’ to ‘protect public health and safety.’"241 
Congress has also designed the tax law to consider the need of the IRS to cooperate with 
many different constituencies including both other federal agencies and states and local 
governments. Section 6103, for instance, envisions that the IRS might share information to states 
for local enforcement purposes,242 to federal officers or employees for administration of federal 
laws not relating to tax administration,243 to committees of Congress,244 among others. In a 
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simple sense, within the structure of the IRS, the IRS depends upon the Department of Justice to 
bring all cases on its behalf before Federal courts. In a more complex and regulatory sense, 
within oversight of organizations exempt from tax, the IRS works hand in hand with the U.S. 
Labor Department in order to share joint oversight of employee plans. In other words, Congress 
recognizes that the tax laws are intricately woven together with the entire federal legal regime. 
They are inseparable. 
Congress has also recognized the deep internal relationship between the IRS and 
campaign finance.245 For instance, Congress prohibits persons from deducting contributions to 
political campaigns.246 Furthermore, a charitable organization has long been prohibited from 
intervening in a political campaign.247 Though it first enacted section 527 of the Code to 
eliminate confusion of how the IRS should tax (or not tax) political parties,248 Congress amended 
section 527 in 2000 to augment the FEC’s role in overseeing campaign finance by grabbing up 
some organizations that did not specifically come within the FEC’s jurisdiction.249 These 
organizations are exempt from tax generally though have to pay tax on any investment 
income.250 Additionally, they are required to disclose their donors.251 
Beyond the practical description of cooperation, there are strong reasons to work towards 
arranging these different enforcement domains and legal regimes to work in tandem. For 
instance, though separate taxing regimes applying to commerce can cause increased inefficiency 
in an economic sense, there is scholarship demonstrating instances where state and federal 
taxation authorities can cooperate to decrease that inefficiency.252 Receiving information from 
the federal government provides states an incentive to cooperate with the federal government on 
joint systems that reduce the inefficiencies of two systems. Additionally, within tax legal 
scholarship, there has been a long recognition that sometimes an enforcement regime works 
better in one domain if it uses frictions from another.253  
 
B. Campaign Finance Law 
 
In addition to tax law, Congress regulates many nonprofit organizations to the extent they 
are engaged in campaign finance.254 Nonprofits have long been involved in the electoral 
system,255 and the United States has tried to regulate the campaign finance of corporate entities 
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since 1907 when Congress enacted the Tillman Act under President Theodore Roosevelt.256 This 
system of law focuses on expenditure limits, contribution limits, and disclosure. Though a series 
of cases over the years has called into question the constitutionality of this system, it is still in 
force today.257 Knowledge of donors to nonprofits is relevant to the enforcement of that law. For 
instance, the system prohibits foreign actors from contributing to campaigns for public office or 
making expenditures for political campaigns.258 To the extent a social welfare organization takes 
money from foreign operators to influence a campaign, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
cares. Some in fact have argued that Congress ought to require public disclosure of substantial 
donors to social welfare organization to ensure that nonprofits do not become a disclosure 
shelter.259 This part describes some of the relevant highly complex federal campaign finance 
laws. It also looks briefly at state campaign finance laws. 
Campaign finance law puts limits on individuals,’ and political committees,’ 
contributions to political committees. For instance, for the period 2020-21, an individual may not 
contribute more than $2,900 to a Candidate Committee, more than $5000 to a Political Action 
Committee (“PAC”), $10,000 per year to a party committee whether state, local or district, 
$36,500 per year to a national party committee, and $109,500 per year to certain other national 
party committees. 260 As to political committees, for instance, no multicandidate political 
committee can make contributions to a candidate of more than $5,000 to a candidate, up to 
$5,000 to other separate PACs, and up to $15,000 per year to a national party committee.261 A 
nonmulticandidate political committee is subject to the same limitations as an individual.262 
Much of the limitations and disclosure depend upon the definition of a political 
committee.263 Though initially defined broadly, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo narrowed that to 
“only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of 
which is the nomination or election of a candidate.”264 This limiting led to many committees that 
might be significantly involved in political campaigns, but that were not under the control of a 
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candidate or that was not engaged in a major purpose of electing a candidate, to generally be 
governed by the disclosure rules of section 527 of the Code and overseen by the IRS instead of 
the FEC.265 Today, many organizations engaged in political work may not be primarily engaged 
in political campaigns and manage to qualify instead as a social welfare organization or business 
league and avoid any disclosure altogether. 
In addition to limitations on contributions, Congress regulates what it refers to as 
“expenditures.” These are defined as “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, 
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing 
any election for Federal office.”266 A national committee, a state committee, and subordinate 
committees to the state committees are limited in their coordinated expenditures on federal 
campaigns to an amount that is connected to the population of a particular state.267 Since Buckley 
though, which struck down limits on individual expenditures, the Court has been much more 
concerned with expenditure limits infringement on speech than with contribution limits or 
disclosure limits.268 Thus, the limits here are lesser. After cases like Citizens United v. FEC, to 
the extent a committee or really any person including a corporation is engaging in what is known 
as “independent expenditures” there are little campaign finance rules limiting such activity.269 
Thus, the only real rules here have to deal with coordinated expenditures of political committees 
generally. 
Finally, there are the disclosure rules. As the Court recognized in Buckley, disclosure 
rules work to provide information to the public on who is supporting campaigns and how they 
are spending it, hinder corruption and the appearance of corruption, and help enforce the 
contribution limits. Some form of disclosure rules has been around since 1910 from the Publicity 
Act. Today, individuals, groups, corporations, labor unions are required to disclose to the FEC 
independent expenditures aggregating more than $250 in a year.270 Those individuals, groups, 
corporations, labor unions that in the aggregate spend in excess of $10,000 on producing or 
airing electioneering communications must file a report with the FEC within 24 hours of the 
public airing of that communication.271 Federal political committees have disclosure obligations 
through registration272 and reporting. Those reports provide the information to the FEC to 
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oversee the contribution and expenditure regime. Candidates, national parties, and federal PACs 
must file quarterly reports identifying donors who have given $200 or more.273 
Post Buckley, the Court has continued to find the disclosure regime Constitutional. In 
McConnell v. FEC and Citizens United v. FEC the Court upheld the electioneering 
communication disclosure provision.274 The primary place where disclosure provisions have 
been found problematic is in as applied challenges where disclosure would result in substantial 
harassment to the individual donations disclosed.275 The Court has occasionally found a 
disclosure provision too broad for its intended purpose such as in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission where it struck down a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign 
literature.276 
As discussed above in Part II, tax-exempt organizations often play the function of 
engaging in political influencing communication. Sometimes that communication is clearly 
regulated by the campaign finance rules such as when a section 527 political organization 
expressly advocates for a candidate. As noted above as well, in 2000 in response to the fact that 
many section 527 organizations are not regulated by the FEC, Congress passed a law requiring 
section 527 organizations not regulated by the FEC to file extensive disclosure with the IRS, 
rather than the FEC.277 Academics in the mid-2000s wrote about the problem of the connection 
of tax exempt organizations engaging in political communications through section 527 
organizations in ways that escaped federal campaign finance law and what to do about that 
problem.278 
 After the Court in Citizens United struck down limits on independent expenditures, 
money moved to other tax-exempt organizations that are at issue here: social welfare 
organizations and business leagues. In 2010-2012 academics again turned to the problem after 
Citizens United seemed to spark dark money organization explosion.279 These organizations 
need not provide disclosure to the FEC or the IRS in the same way that section 527 organizations 
must disclose this political related activity. Many tax-exempt organization communications are 
not regulated and need not be reported. For instance, issue advocacy communications made by 
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social welfare organizations and business leagues will typically not be regulated by the campaign 
finance system, but directly impact our politics.  
Different metaphors have been used over time to describe the challenges of building a 
complete campaign finance system. Professor Donald Tobin described the challenge as leaky 
plumbing: “campaign finance laws can be seen as the regulatory plumbing that helps direct the 
flow of money in a way that promotes democratic ideals.”280 It is an apt metaphor to think about 
the context of donor disclosure as a part of leaky plumbing. If individuals or organizations have 
the potential to run their donations outside the regulatory pipes that capture and disclose 
contributions and expenditures, then the regulatory pipes are leaky and ineffective. They do not 
accomplish their democratic aims and they fail to prohibit the corruption they are intended to 
stop. 
Using the other common metaphor for campaign finance, the idea of lightness and 
darkness, many refer to the campaign dollars spent in social welfare organizations and business 
leagues as “dark money,” because those who support those efforts are able to keep their 
anonymity.281 Open Secrets at the Center for Responsive Politics estimated in October 2020 that 
such dark money groups spent more than $750 million in the 2020 campaign.282 Thus, significant 
money moves through the tax exempt sector. Requiring disclosure to the IRS could provide 
something of a backstop to the campaign finance laws. Without them, donors that have an 
interest in avoiding the campaign finance regime and avoid disclosure have an easy path through. 
 
C. State Nonprofit Law and Consumer Protection 
 
State authorities oversee nonprofit corporations in a few different capacities.283 Those 
systems are highly varied and thus this part is provided only at a high level of generality.284 
Some states maintain a tax-exempt system that may exempt a nonprofit from property taxes 
and/or income taxes.285 Many states have a state income tax that mirrors the federal income tax 
system. To the extent a state system employs some form of income tax exemption, the same 
issues discussed in Part II apply to states. The state would have the same need for this donor 
information as discussed with regard to the IRS. States also employ campaign finance regulatory 
systems that are similar to the federal system discussed above. Again, to the extent a state 
maintains such a system, it has the same need and interest in the donor information. Additionally, 
states oversee state nonprofit law.286 Typically, a state attorney general enforces state nonprofit 
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law by ensuring directors manage nonprofit corporation assets properly and do not violate their 
fiduciary duties.287 Finally, state attorneys general oversee various types of consumer deceptive 
trade practices with a particular focus on charitable solicitation.288 Because the tax systems and 
campaign finance system issues should be quite similar, this section will focus on nonprofit laws 
protecting charitable assets and imposing fiduciary duties, and consumer deceptive practices. 
A key piece of nonprofit law is that there are no owners of a nonprofit organization.289 
Professor Henry Hansmann referred to this as the non-distribution constraint.290 This does not 
mean that a nonprofit organization is prohibited from making a profit, only that it is forbidden 
from distributing that profit.291 Nonprofit corporations are instead managed by directors and 
officers to pursue a particular mission of that organization. For this reason, it is not easy for any 
interest other than the attorney general to gain standing to bring actions against the misuse of 
these organizations.292 Some states allow member derivative actions, but that is not the case in 
most states. Thus, there are no insiders who can ensure that assets dedicated to some purpose are 
used appropriately. This makes nonprofit oversight a challenge. 
That said, nonprofits are typically divided into two types: mutual benefit and public 
benefit.293 Charitable organizations are often thought to work for the public benefit because they 
typically have no particular members to oversee that the organization purpose is carried out. 
Mutual benefits on the other hand typically have members who have a vested interest in the 
activity of the organization. For the most part, business leagues fit into the latter category. A 
business league is often a membership organization that tries to further its member’s interest. 
The American Plywood Association, for instance, has the support of plywood businesses and 
will try to generally further the plywood industry. Regulators have tended to be much less 
worried about mutual benefit than public benefit organizations for the obvious reason that mutual 
benefit organizations are likely to have more individuals who care to ensure the organization is 
operated properly through their ability to vote on the operation of the organization. The difficulty 
is social welfare organizations are often not mutual benefit organizations.294 Though business 
leagues typically do not fall into the mutual benefit category, and it may seem odd to think of 
them in a public benefit sense, there is nothing that stops them from forming a more public 
benefit like operation.  
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State nonprofit corporation acts typically provide for two main fiduciary duties of officers 
and directors: a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.295 The duty of care requires the officers and 
directors to take the kind of care they would take with their own important matters.296 Before 
deciding, the officer or director must inform himself or herself about the options and the 
consequences associated with a particular decision. The duty of loyalty requires the director to 
ensure that it operates the nonprofit in the interest of the nonprofit and not of themselves.297 This 
is often described as a prohibition on self-dealing. The director or officer cannot take advantage 
of the nonprofit for themselves. Finally, charitable solicitation laws prevent the fraudulent raising 
of funds for nonprofits. 
What are the circumstances where a state attorney general then might need the use of 
substantial donor names and addresses? The general suspects for misuse of the organizations’ 
assets are, of course, officers and directors because they have control over the organization. 
Those individuals are public facing. The other usual suspect is a substantial contributor to the 
organization. These are individuals who might in effect be the equivalent of shareholders of the 
corporation. The corporation may be directed in effect to provide prohibited profits to substantial 
donors. A nonprofit regulator can easily see officers and directors because these are the public 
facing individuals of a nonprofit organization. Substantial donors, however, are not public 
facing. Thus, finding them can be exceedingly hard. A nonprofit delivering substantial contracts 
to a particular business unrelated to the officers or directors may seem perfectly normal without 
the knowledge that a substantial donor owns that business. It is not much different than 
corruption in a government entity. Access to the Schedule B can aid the attorney general in their 
enforcement job. It can help them detect fraud in a nonprofit. It helps them to know the 
individuals who are most likely to misuse the assets of the nonprofit.  
There is no end to a misuse of nonprofit organizations. At the beginning of the Article, I 
highlighted the Ohio bribery scheme run out of a social welfare organization by Larry 
Householder that is currently subject to a criminal complaint. Recently, there has been 
significant allegations against the NRA.298 In addition to delivering its assets to its officers and 
directors, there are indications that the NRA may have taken in foreign donations and while we 
do not have direct evidence yet, it is possible the organization has been operated for substantial 
donors. No regulator could know the extent of malfeasance without that crucial information. One 
group recently took advantage of the Wounded Warrior Project name to raise funds as the 
Wounded Warrior Fund or Foundation.299 They formed as a social welfare organization that they 
initially tried to register with the IRS. Because their efforts were not that good, the IRS had 
revoked their status, but there is no reason to think others have not thought of this possibility to 
scamming people out of their money. 
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Though the evidence may be that state attorneys general do not explicitly use donor 
information often,300 the information is useful for enforcement purposes and likely acts as a 
deterrent. As Evelyn Brody noted years ago, “To a large degree, legislatures are coming to view 
sunshine as the best disinfectant, and Congress and the states are increasing nonprofit or tax-
exempt disclosure requirements to allow a better-informed public to provide oversight—although 
private parties cannot generally enforce nonprofit laws in court.”301  
As we must with the federal level, we ought to consider the enforcement environment at 
the state level too. If IRS enforcement is lacking, state level enforcement, with the exception of a 
few states, is in some states almost non-existent.302 States rarely provide the funds necessary to 
enforce these laws.303 Even when they do, the attorney general is such a political position that 
they often have limited interest in enforcing these laws.304 It’s hard to consider that without 
considering the odd nature of the IRS decision to eliminate one of its important tools in 
understanding the people who have a strong interest in misusing these nonprofits who have few 
public protectors of their interest. 
As discussed above in Part III, Congress both makes most of the Form 990 information 
publicly available in part to ensure public accountability with mission and with general federal, 
state, and local laws,305 but also provides states with access to information for state enforcement 
purposes.306 As I do research to write this article, it is hard to find an article that does not hone in 
on this need for accountability, lack of enforcement, and need for the IRS and states to work 
together in regulating the nonprofit sector. It makes the IRS move in this instance suggesting it 
acts alone and has no other constituency other than ensuring the tax laws are enforced an odd, 
out of place, pronouncement. 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
The question of this article is whether the IRS should return to requiring social welfare 
organizations and business leagues to annually disclose the names and addresses of their 
substantial contributors privately to the IRS on their annual Form 990. The IRS apparently long 
struggled to ensure that personal information such as social security numbers placed on the 
Schedule B not be disclosed. It is hard to believe though that this was an insurmountable 
problem. The IRS may have calculated that ending the collection of this information will mean 
that a claim that the IRS targeted individuals and groups as in the Tea Party affair could be 
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lessened if it does not regularly collect donor information.307 This might be a rational choice 
from the perspective of the IRS in trying to protect its employees and the institution from claims 
of political bias and the massive consequent harm therefrom. But the long-term harms to tax 
collection, the rule of law, and to democracy from no longer collecting this vital information 
likely outweigh these interests. 
This Analysis first returns to the question of whether disclosure of donor names and 
addresses to the IRS is an important part of the tax law associated with social welfare 
organizations and business leagues. It also considers whether disclosure matters as to the 
enforcement of individual income tax matters. This review considers both whether the 
information is needed to enforce the law, and whether it serves as a deterrent. Secondly, this Part 
V will look at whether in shaping tax law, the IRS should consider the value the collection of this 
information provides in serving ancillary legal purposes such as campaign finance and state 
nonprofit law. Finally, this part evaluates the interests in the rule of law and the interests in 
democracy including the interest of freedom of speech and association. 
As demonstrated above in Part II, both social welfare organizations and business leagues 
are supposed to carry out collective activity and not operate for private interests.308 The most 
prominent tax law way in which this notion is expressed is that social welfare organizations and 
business leagues are prohibited from (1) allowing earnings to inure to the benefit of private 
shareholders, and (2) from providing too much private benefit to individuals rather than 
primarily furthering an exempt purpose.309 Additionally, with respect to social welfare 
organizations, they are prohibited from providing “excess benefits” to disqualified persons.310 As 
a practical matter, to enforce the basic tax law, that means the IRS must be able to generate a 
record about organizational activity that shows the IRS where money is coming from and where 
that money is going. Substantial donors are a significant source of from where an organization is 
obtaining its money. Congress and the IRS have long recognized that substantial contributors are 
the most likely persons who may be in the nature of private shareholders for purposes of 
inurement and private benefit.311 They are a likely candidate for whom an entity is going to 
operate for instead of the collective. Congress itself saw substantial contributors as individuals 
who may use nonprofit social welfare organizations for improper excess benefit transactions.312 
It is hard to know how the IRS will enforce these laws fundamental to tax-exempt 
organizations without knowing the substantial contributors. Admittedly, Congress does not apply 
section 4958 to business leagues suggesting that the case for maintaining donor information for 
tax reasons is modestly weaker for these organizations. Nevertheless, the same principles hold in 
analyzing private benefit and inurement, and it seems logical that in order to enforce these basic 
requirements, the IRS needs to know who the substantial donors are. To eliminate this 
requirement is for the IRS to fly blind as it tries to enforce the law. The IRS solution to require 
organizations to maintain this information and provide it if asked seems a pale substitute and 
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unlikely to provide the IRS the ability to actually enforce the tax law regarding these 
organizations. 
Many have argued, including the IRS, that donor names and addresses should not be 
collected because the IRS does not use the information in an *important* way for purposes of 
selecting organizations for audit presumably. It is entirely possible that the IRS does not use the 
donor names a whole lot for purposes of audit. This should not be all that surprising. As 
discussed in Part III(C), there is a very low rate of audit across the IRS and particularly in the 
nonprofit sector. The IRS is severely lacking in the resources it needs to enforce the tax law. 
Nevertheless, the argument that the information is not used often is not entitled to much weight. 
It is foolish to end collection of information that is necessary to tax enforcement because at this 
moment in time the tax collector happens to not be able to use that information. 
The collection of this information also likely has some deterrent effect as discussed in 
Part III. This makes the IRS claim that this is information is needed but can be obtained upon an 
audit for enforcement purposes much less satisfying of a claim. As the Treasury Department 
notes itself, tax noncompliance is at its worst when there is no third-party reporting.313 Though 
the Form 990 serves as an information return, as discussed in Part III, it also has an information 
reporting aspect to it as well. Any organizational return in effect must also act as an information 
reporting return because they necessarily relate to the individuals associated with the 
organization. Given the almost negligible IRS audit rates of nonprofits it seems incumbent upon 
the IRS to depend upon simple means of obtaining compliance. Requiring information reporting 
is a smart way of dealing with these challenges. 
Professor Lederman’s work suggests that information reporting from a nonprofit 
organization in this context might not be ideal for a few reasons. First, nonprofits are generally 
tax indifferent parties and may have reason to collude with the party being reported about.   
It is acknowledged that sometimes, information requested might be particularly 
burdensome. Where the information is burdensome and relatively unimportant there can be a 
good case for the IRS to forgo such information. But no one has ever suggested that having to 
provide donor names and addresses adds to taxpayer burdens in any substantial way. The main 
organization complaint is that some donors might not want to donate if they believe they might 
be subject to harassment. Though this is a valid concern, and I discuss it a bit more below, there 
is very little likelihood of that happening in the disclosure to the IRS because the donor data is 
not publicly released. Furthermore, the IRS has a reasonably strong track record of maintaining 
the secrecy of that information.314  
 This information is not just useful for enforcing the law regarding tax exempt status. It is 
also useful for enforcing both the individual income tax and the gift and potentially estate tax. 
The IRS can use the donor data to help build a case that a taxpayer is in a position to utilize the 
organization in a way to benefit themselves. Admittedly, this is a more tenuous connection. It is 
a more tenuous connection because the IRS would need to derive from the fact that a particular 
individual is a substantial contributor for income tax purposes that the IRS might want to see if 
the individual is deriving some benefits from the organization that they are not reporting. In other 
words, a taxpayer who is improperly avoiding income tax by utilizing a tax-exempt organization 
in effect as a tax shelter. Though the IRS might be able to figure this information out without 
donor information, it makes the IRS’s effort much simpler if that information is immediately 
available on the form. This would apply as well to the enforcement of ensuring that money spent 
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on political activity and lobbying is not allowed. Donor names and addresses would help the IRS 
solve such problems much quicker. Additionally, the information reporting role of the form 
serving as a deterrent is probably a more satisfying rationale in this realm. If the donor knows 
that the IRS has this information, they may be less likely to abuse the nonprofit in these types of 
ways. Finally, knowing the donors to these organizations could help in the enforcement of gift 
and estate tax rules. Though the gift tax does not apply to a gift to either a social welfare 
organization or a business league anymore, knowing who the donor is allows the IRS to make 
assessments as to whether these organizations qualify for those statuses in the first place.  
The IRS argues it can just collect the information on audit when it needs it and protect 
donor privacy better thereby.315 This argument is worth a little more analysis.  First, anytime the 
IRS must collect information on audit the process becomes much more difficult, particularly 
from someone who wants to hide that information in the first place. The IRS can request an 
organization voluntarily turn over information.316 It will require much more significant effort on 
the part of the IRS which must use the Department of Justice to issue summons to collect that 
information. Allowing them to just provide the information on audit is a poor substitute. 
Secondly, it is interesting that they think the information needs to be maintained for purposes of 
audit. If the information is not necessary for enforcement purposes, why would it also to be kept 
for audit purposes. The IRS in effect realizes the importance from a legal perspective in donor 
information to enforce the tax law. Third, by the position the IRS has taken in the preamble to 
this regulation, they risk having a tougher time now actually collecting that information on audit 
because the agency has stated that the information is just not that important. They will thus 
compound insult on top of injury. 
As discussed in Part III(A), the IRS argues in its adoption of the new rule that it has 
means of overseeing private benefit issues without this particular donor information. They are 
presumably referring to the Schedule L of the Form 990, which forces nonprofits, depending on 
type, to disclose certain transactions with interested persons, such as substantial donors.317 A key 
piece of information an agent needs to be able to spot a private benefit issue in a substantial 
donor case is that a particular individual has made a substantial donation to the nonprofit. 
Though Schedule L may, or should, collect a good bit of the instances in which the IRS might 
need to enforce the law in the case of violating the rules against private benefit, it does not 
capture the field. Controlling individuals can direct the use of a nonprofit in their direction 
without the nonprofit actually carrying out business with the individuals themselves. The 
Schedule L is not a perfect substitute for knowing all of the substantial donors, rather than just 
those the organization directly engages in a transaction with that is subject to the disclosure 
limits of Schedule L. 
The primary substantive argument for why disclosure should not be required is that it will 
chill free association and speech. Though this is not public disclosure, we must accept that this is 
a possible result of that collection even when only collected for government purposes. Ideally, 
we would minimize hindrance to formation of associations to express political ideas. Freedom of 
speech and association are a key piece of a democratic order. However, there are other issues of 
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democracy involved. Those include (1) an interest in full information to society, including 
information about the potential biases of information we are receiving; (2) an interest in laws 
being publicly perceived to be enforced equally; and (3) an interest in not providing certain 
organizations or individuals benefits in their political activities that others are not provided. 
When these additional considerations are brought into view, it seems that they likely outweigh 
the value of any modest harm providing the donor information to the IRS might have on a small 
group of donors to causes. The IRS collects all sundry types of information in enforcing the tax 
laws in very intrusive ways. As noted in Part III(C) one of the primary tools the IRS has in 
reducing the tax gap is information reporting. However, here, on a matter that resoundingly is to 
the benefit of wealthy individuals, the IRS is willing to give up information that it itself admits is 
important. That choice itself, to protect the privacy of wealthy interests, may be perceived as 
biased and therefore democratically suspect. 
There is one other democratic concern, however, that should not be just waved aside. The 
IRS ends up in the cross hairs of trying to enforce a law regarding the operation of political 
activity of our citizens. In a democratic sense it is critical that the IRS be seen to publicly enforce 
the law equally among all citizens. If that notion is corrupted, there is a genuine harm to our 
democratic effort. Whether legitimate or not, the Tea Party affair caused real harm to the 
reputation of the IRS in a democratic sense.318 Placing the IRS in the position of regulating 
political activity at all thus causes harm. However, the collection of data alone regarding donor 
names and addresses does not so implicate the IRS in this space that we should think the benefits 
of proper tax administration are outweighed. As noted, numerous times above, there is a real 
public interest in the operations of nonprofit organizations. Congress has taken the position that 
public disclosure of information regarding these institutions is important enough to require broad 
public disclosure of their activities. It would be a bizarre choice to decide that one of the most 
likely abusers of these important public entities can easily hide behind anonymous contributions 
as they use the nonprofit for their own ends. 
What value should we place on the IRS collecting donor information to help enforce laws 
ancillary to the tax laws such as campaign finance and state nonprofit law? While they should 
not be a dominant motive, the IRS ought to give the value associated with aiding those regimes 
some weight as it considers whether to maintain the requirement. The IRS takes the strong 
position in the regulations eliminating the collection of donor information that the IRS job is to 
administer the Code, and that it should give little regard to campaign finance or state nonprofit 
law.319 Thus, it is neither responsible for the collection of information helpful to the FEC nor to 
states.  
Obviously, the President oversees all of our federal laws and can ensure that our 
bureaucracy works in tandem. It seems odd for an agency to take a position that it has no 
responsibility to consider cooperating in these ways. Additionally, as Part IV(A) has shown, it is 
well within the norm for Congress to allow and often encourage agencies to cooperate. Congress 
has specifically included the IRS as a partner in enforcing campaign finance limitations.320 It did 
this specifically in enacting the donor disclosure regime for section 527 organizations that do not 
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need file with the FEC. This begins to develop a legislative record that Congress does consider 
campaign finance part of the IRS’s mission, and that the IRS ought to consider its role more 
deeply as it evaluates the enforcement choices it makes. Though the IRS obviously should 
prioritize its mission of collecting revenue, it was incorrect for the IRS to summarily reject any 
Federal campaign finance interest outside of the collection of revenue.  
It is worth making one further point on campaign finance. Though it is a common theme 
that the Code is not established to punish illegality, an organization cannot qualify as a tax-
exempt organization where it engages in illegal activity to accomplish its purpose.321 An 
organization that accepts illegal campaign related contributions from foreigners, or others who 
are prohibited, therefore might be in violation of the requirements of either being a social welfare 
organization or business league. Thus, the requirement to disclose donors does not even need to 
be seen as a means to enforce campaign finance, but simply as a means of enforcing the tax laws. 
What about state nonprofit law? The IRS has long worked with different agencies and it 
also works directly with states in enforcing charitable law.322 Congress established a tax return 
for charities the Form 990 that it makes public in part at least to aid in the overall oversight of 
nonprofits, which includes state actors. State charity regulators have long relied upon this 
relationship.323 This sudden spurning of state interest in IRS choices in the regulation of 
nonprofits is a problematic trajectory when we look at the likelihood of anemic enforcement in 
this area. Like discussed in the opening of this article we can expect more Clarks talking to Larry 
Householders engaged in bribery schemes saying: “they can give as much or more to the (c)(4) 
and nobody would ever know. So, you don’t have to be afraid of anyone because there’s a 
mechanism to change it.”324 Given the stakes, and the long relationship, established both by 
Congress and the President through the IRS and Treasury Department, it seemed strange to give 
so little value to considering the possibility of whether IRS information collection should be 
maintained for ancillary law purposes. With research showing that it is possible to build a more 
efficient regulatory regime when state and federal groups cooperate, and the real need for 
efficient use of resources in overseeing the charitable sector, the IRS should in the future more 
strongly consider state interests here. If they did, I think they would find the case for maintaining 
the donor information much stronger. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Amid extraordinary political pressure, the IRS and Treasury chose to end a long-time 
practice of requiring many tax-exempt organizations to disclose donor names and addresses. 
Though that may have ended a challenging problem for the IRS, that of inadvertently disclosing 
taxpayer information, this assessment suggests it will cause more harm in the long run. 
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It seems there are a couple of sleights of hand going on here. The first is a communal 
belief that somehow this donor disclosure is simply about enforcing campaign finance. Once that 
premise is accepted, we think of the collection of this information as a potential affront to earnest 
donors who might want to speak and are hindered from that action by a dangerous government 
tax collector. The second is a sense of the term “disclosure” as a public “disclosure” rather than 
the highly limited disclosure to tax authorities and those that have a reason for access to that 
information. This makes the matter a charged issue of government overreach, rather than a 
question of good collective enforcement of our tax laws and other ancillary laws that lead to a 
better designed community. 
The reality is that the disclosure has import to tax collection and tax exemption. It is 
ironic that in the enforcement environment that we face, where the chance of IRS audit is slim to 
none, that we would collectively choose to eliminate information about payments from wealthy 
individuals to groups that engage in providing collective goods and services and engage in 
influencing our political world. It is ironic too, that we are willing to require intrusive 
information reporting of all sorts of transfers of value from salaries, contractual payments, to 
international transfers, but we are simultaneously unwilling to request disclosure that relates to 
the wealthy and their related tax-exempt organizations. It fails as a matter of political justice by 
privileging the wealthy, shielding them in their transfers from government oversight. It also fails 
as a matter of political justice by visibly appearing to not apply the law to wealthy individuals 
seeking to influence our collective decisions. 
We are not talking about the matter of public disclosure of substantial donor data. This is 
only about providing important information to the IRS to properly carry out their charge to 
enforce the tax law. The information at once helps the IRS enforce the boundaries on legitimate 
tax-exempt activity and helps detect abuse of the individual income tax system. It also provides a 
useful backstop to enforce the gift and tax laws as well. This donor information is efficiently 
collected at the IRS and helps oversee both campaign finance regimes and state nonprofit law. 
Those concerns should have been given more weight in the choice to end its collection. Finally, 
while as a democratic matter, there may be some modest benefit from alleviating donors from the 
worry that the government will know about certain donations they have made towards free 
speech activity, the harm to those who are not able to make use of these structures, the harm to 
those who are deprived of information regarding the biases associated with particular political 
activity, and the harm to the belief that the law will be enforced equally upon all, is much more 
weighty. With these considerations in mind, the IRS and Treasury ought to rescind its most 
recent guidance on this matter. If not, Congress ought to require this substantial donor 
information be disclosed by law.  
